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ABSTRACT
Pre-trained Deep Neural Network (DNN) models are increasingly
used in smartphones and other user devices to enable prediction
services, leading to potential disclosures of (sensitive) information
from training data captured inside these models. Based on the con-
cept of generalization error, we propose a framework to measure
the amount of sensitive information memorized in each layer of a
DNN. Our results show that, when considered individually, the last
layers encode a larger amount of information from the training data
compared to the first layers. We find that, while the neuron of con-
volutional layers can expose more (sensitive) information than that
of fully connected layers, the same DNN architecture trained with
different datasets has similar exposure per layer. We evaluate an
architecture to protect the most sensitive layers within the memory
limits of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) against potential
white-box membership inference attacks without the significant
computational overhead.
KEYWORDS
Deep learning, privacy, training data, sensitive information expo-
sure, trusted execution environment.
1 INTRODUCTION
On-device DNNs have achieved impressive performance on a broad
spectrum of services based on images, audio, and text. Examples
include face recognition for authentication [18], speech recogni-
tion for interaction [8] and natural language processing for auto-
correction [1]. However, DNNs memorize in their parameters in-
formation from the training data [20–22]. Thus, keeping DNNs
accessible in user devices leads to privacy concerns when training
data contains sensitive information.
Previous works have shown that a reconstruction of the original
input data is easier from the first layers of a DNN, when using
for inference the layer’s output (activation) [3, 13, 14]. In addition,
the functionality of the parameters of each layer is different. For
example, parameters of first layers trained (on images) output low-
level features, whereas parameters of later layers learn higher level
features, such as faces [21].
We hypothesize that the memorization of sensitive information
from training data differs across the layers of a DNN and, in this
paper, present an approach to measure this sensitive information.
We show that each layer behaves differently on the data they were
trained on compared to data seen for the first time, by quantifying
the generalization error (i.e. the expected distance between predic-
tion accuracy of training data and test data [16, 20]). We further
quantify the risk of sensitive information exposure of each layer as
a function of its maximum and minimum possible generalization
error. The larger the generalization error, the easier the inference
of sensitive information from training set data.
We perform experiments by training VGG-7 [17] on three image
datasets: MNIST [7], Fashion-MNIST [19], and CIFAR-10 [6]. Our
results show that last layers memorize more sensitive information
about training data, and the risk of information exposure of a layer
is independent of the dataset.
To protect the most sensitive layers from potential white-box
attacks [4, 9, 11], we leverage a resource-limited Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) [2, 5, 12] unit, Arm’s TrustZone, as a protection
example. Experiments are conducted by training last layers in the
TEE and first layers outside the TEE. Results show that the overhead
in memory, execution time and power consumption is minor, thus
making it an affordable solution to protect a model from potential
attacks.
2 PROPOSED APPROACH
2.1 Problem Definition
Let M(θ ) be a DNN with L layers, parameterized by θ = {θl }Ll=1,
where θl is the matrix with the parameters of layer l . Let X =
{Xk }Kk=1 be the training set of K images Xk . Let S = {Sk }
Ks
k=1 ⊂ X ,
a randomly selected subset of X with Ks = K/2, be the private
dataset and T = {Tk }Ktk=1 ⊂ X , with T ∩ S = ∅, be the non-private
dataset.
As trainingM(θ ) on S might embed some information of Sk in
the parameters of each layer, we aim to quantify the exposure of
sensitive information in each θl . The sensitive information we are
interested in analyzing is the absence or presence of any Sk in the
training data.
2.2 Sensitive Information Exposure
We leverage the fact thatM(θ ), trained on S , has a higher accuracy
of predicting classes of data points from S than from another dataset,
T . The difference in prediction accuracy indicates the generaliza-
tion error [16, 20] of M(θ ) and how easy is to recognize whether
a data point Xk was in S during training. We define the risk of
sensitive information exposure of each θl based on the maximum
and minimum possible generalization errors (see Figure 1). A larger
difference in the maximum and minimum of generalization error
could show the more sensitive information exposure which results
in inferring more accurately the absence or presence of data in the
training data (i.e. membership inference attack [20]).
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Figure 1: The proposed framework for measuring the risk of exposing sensitive information in a deep neural network M
trained on a private dataset S . Mb and Ms are obtained by fine-tuning the parameters of a target layer l on the whole training
set X (i.e. both S and non-private training set T ) and S , respectively.
To obtain the maximum generalization error, we increase the
chance of overfitting θl to S by fine-tuning θl and by freezing
parameters of other layers of M . We call this model Ms (θs ). If
C(Ms , Si ) is the distance betweenMs and Si measured by the cost
function used in training, we quantify ϵs , the generalization error
ofMs (θs ), based on its different behaviour on S and T :
ϵs = ETi ∈T [C(Ms ,Ti )] − ESi ∈S [C(Ms , Si )], (1)
where E[·] is the mathematical expectation.
To obtain the minimum generalization error without forgetting S ,
we create a baselineMb (θb ) by fine-tuning θl on X and by freezing
the parameters of the other layers ofM . This fine-tuning makes θbl
generalized on both T and S , which can be quantified as:
ϵb = ETi ∈T [C(Mb ,Ti )] − ESi ∈S [C(Mb , Si )]. (2)
M(θ ),Ms (θs ) andMb (θb ) share the same layers, except the target
layer l . Therefore, the differences in each pair of
{ETi ∈T [C(Ms ,Ti )],ETi ∈T [C(Mb ,Ti )]},
and
{ESi ∈S [C(Ms , Si )],ESi ∈S [C(Mb , Si )]},
are due to different parameters of layer l .
We therefore quantify RMs , the risk of sensitive information
exposure of layer l , by comparing the generalization error of Ms
andMb :
RMs = ϵs − ϵb
ϵs
. (3)
The larger RMs , the higher the risk of exposing sensitive infor-
mation.
3 MEASURING INFORMATION EXPOSURE
3.1 Model and Datasets
We use VGG-7 as the DNNM , which has six convolutional layers
followed by one fully connected layer (16C3-16C3-MP-32C3-32C3-
MP-32C3-32C3-MP-64FC-10SM). Each layer is followed by Rectifier
Linear Unit (ReLU) [10] activation function.
We use three datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10.
MNIST includes 60k training images of 28 × 28 × 1 handwritten
digits of 10 classes (i.e. 0 to 9). Fashion-MNIST contains 60k 28 ×
28 × 1 images of 10 classes of clothing, namely T-shirt/top, trouser,
pullover, dress, coat, sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, and ankle boot.
CIFAR-10 includes 50k training 32 × 32 × 3 images of 10 classes
including airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship,
and truck.
We split each training set into set S and set T , as explained
in Sec. 2.1. We use 20 epochs for MNIST, 40 epochs for Fashion-
MNIST, and 60 epochs for CIFAR-10. The accuracy of VGG-7 on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 is 99.29%, 90.55%, and 71.63%,
respectively. We then fine-tuneM asMs andMb with 10 epochs for
MNIST, 20 epochs for Fashion-MNIST, and 30 epochs for CIFAR-10.
3.2 Results and Discussion
Generalization error. Figure 2 shows the generalization errors of
Ms and Mb . For all three datasets, the baseline model Mb , as ex-
pected, has higher generalization errors than the modelMs , whose
layer l is overfitted to dataset S , while the generalization error of
CIFAR-10 is greater than that of Fashion-MNIST that in turn is
greater than that of MNIST. A more complex dataset (e.g. CIFAR-10)
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Figure 2: Generalization errors of Ms and Mb trained on half of the training set, S , of (a) MNIST, (b) Fashion-MNIST and
(c) CIFAR-10 for fine-tuning each target layer. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: The risk of sensitive information exposure of VGG-
7 per layer on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
is associated to a larger difference between S and T compared to a
less complex dataset (e.g. MNIST), so it is harder to generalize the
model to predict T by training with S .
As we go through the convolutional layers, the generalization er-
ror ofMs increases, while the generalization error ofMb decreases
until the 5th or 6th layer. A possible explanation is that first layers
memorize generic information (e.g. colors, and corners), whereas
last layers memorize more specific information that can be used
to identify a specific image. For example, fine-tuning the last lay-
ers using S leadsMs to memorize specific information of S , which
consequentially increases the generalization errors of Ms when
predicting T .
Sensitive information exposure. Figure 3 shows the risk of sen-
sitive information exposure for each layer of VGG-7 on all three
datasets. The first layer has the lowest risk, and the risk increases as
we go through the layers, with the last convolutional layer having
the highest sensitive information exposure, which is 0.63 for both
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST and 0.5 for CIFAR-10. This confirms
the bigger derivation of the generalization error ofMs fromMb in
the last layers than the first layers. In addition, the order of layers in
terms of sensitive information exposure is almost the same across
all three datasets.
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Figure 4: Risk per neuron for each layer on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR-10. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
We also compute the risk per neuron for each layer by normaliz-
ing the risk of sensitive information exposure by the total number
of neurons of the layer (Figure 4). The results show the risk per neu-
ron increases as we move through convolutional layers. Neurons in
the late convolutional layers have high capabilities in memorizing
sensitive information, whereas the fully connected layer (layer 7)
has a much smaller risk per neuron.
4 TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Setup
In this section, we develop an implementation and evaluate the cost
of protecting the last layers of an on-device DNN during fine-tuning
by deploying them in the TrustZone of a device (see Figure 5). Trust-
Zone is ARM’s TEE implementation that establishes a private region
on the main processor. Both hardware and software approaches
isolate this region to allow trusted execution. As TEEs are usually
small, we only protect the most sensitive layers of the model and
use the normal execution environment for the other layers.
We use Darknet [15] DNN library in Open Portable TEE (OP-
TEE)1, a TEE framework based on TrustZone, of a Raspberry Pi 3
Model B. This model of Raspberry Pi 3 runs instances of OP-TEE
1https://www.op-tee.org
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Figure 5: Using a TEE to protect the most sensitive layers
(last layers) of an on-device deep neural network.
with 16 mebibytes (MiB) TEE’s memory. The choice of Darknet [15]
is due to its high performance and small dependencies. The scripts
we used in our evaluation are available online2.
We fine-tune the pre-trained VGG-7 (from the previous section)
with MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. Continuous layers are
deployed in the TrustZone from the end for simplicity, including
both layers with (i.e. the convolutional and fully connected layer)
and without (i.e. the dropout and maxpooling layer) trainable pa-
rameters.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Figure 6 shows the execution time (in seconds), memory usage (in
MB), and power consumption (in Watt, using RuiDeng USB Tester
(UM25C)3) of securing a part of the DNN in the TrustZone, starting
from the last layer, and continuing adding layers until the maximum
number of layers the zone can hold.
The resulting execution times are MNIST: F(7,232) = 3658, p <
0.001; CIFAR-10: F(7,232) = 2396, p < 0.001 and memory usage
is MNIST: F(7,232) = 11.62, p < 0.001; CIFAR-10: F(7,232) = 20.01,
p < 0.001. The increase however is small compared to the baseline
(Execution time: 1.94% for MNIST and 1.62% for CIFAR-10; Memory
usage: 2.43% forMNIST and 2.19% for CIFAR-10). Moreover, running
layers in the TrustZone did not significantly influence the power
usage (MNIST: F(7,232) = 1.49, p = 0.170; CIFAR-10: F(7,232) = 1.61,
p = 0.132).
Specifically, deploying the dropout layer and the maxpooling
layer in the TEE increases both the execution time and memory
usage. The reason is that these two types of layers have no train-
able parameters, and for Darknet, the dropout and maxpooling are
directly operated based on trainable parameters of their front layer.
Therefore, to run these two types of layers in the TEE, their front
layer (i.e. fully connected/convolutional layers) needs to be copied
into the TEE, which increases the cost. For layers with parameters
that we aim to protect (1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 6), deploying fully
connected layers (i.e. 1, 2) in the TEE does not increase the execu-
tion time accumulated on first layers, and does not increase the
2https://github.com/mofanv/darknetp
3http://www.ruidengkeji.com
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Figure 6: Execution time, memory usage and power usage
for protecting layers of VGG-7 trained on MNIST (left col-
umn) and CIFAR-10 dataset (right column) using the Trust-
Zone of device. The x-axis corresponds to several last layers
included in the TrustZone.O refers to the calculation of cost
function; SM, FC,D,MP, andC refer to the softmax, fully con-
nected, dropout, maxpooling, convolutional layers of VGG-
7. Number of layers with trainable parameters in the Trust-
Zone are 1, 2, 3, and 4. The dash line represent the baseline,
which runs all the layers outside the TrustZone. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
memory usage. Deploying convolutional layers (i.e. 3 and 4) leads to
an increase of execution time but does not increase memory usage
when using MNIST. The second convolutional layer (i.e. 4) only in-
creases memory usage when using CIFAR-10. However, exhausting
the most available memory of the TEE can also cause an increase
of overhead, so the reason for this increment of memory usage
needs more analysis. Overall, for our implementation, protecting
fully connected and convolutional layers has lower costs than other
layers without trainable parameters with the TEE.
5 CONCLUSION
We proposed a method to measure the exposure of sensitive infor-
mation in each layer of a pre-trained DNN model. We showed that
the closer the layer is to the output, the higher the likelihood that
sensitive information of training data is exposed, which is opposite
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to the exposure risk of layers’ activation from test data [3]. We eval-
uated the use of TEE to protect individual sensitive layers (i.e. the
last layers) of a deployed DNN. The results show that TEE has a
promising performance at low cost.
Future work includes investigating the advantages of protect-
ing the later layers of a DNN against, among others, white-box
membership inference attacks [11].
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